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has become a very lucrative business. ' In fact, gaming is an essential means of attaining tribal self-sufficiency and self-government." This has now been confirmed by several studies. These studies indicate a series of impacts that stimulate economic growth.' All the benefits which necessarily follow from increased employment multiply at a high rate. This is referred to as the "multiplier effect." 9 Gaming additionally increases the number of visitors to tribal reservations. These visitors contribute to the economic growth because they frequently spend money on goods 'and services beyond mere gaming. ' It is important to note that all revenues from gaming operations are reinvested in the tribal community to advance tribal economic development as mandated by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)." For example, in 1994 the Mashantucket Pequot Indians in southeastern Connecticut generated over $800 million dollars from their Foxwoods Casino." The Pequots have used this money to employ every member of the tribe and pay of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York, stated that "[ihe casino is not a statement of who we are, but only a means to get us to where we want to be. We had tried poverty for 200 years, so we decided to try something else. 407-08 (1996) . "Indian gaming produces about $7 billion in gross revenues annually, of which the Tribes net between $750 million and $1 billion." Id. at 408. 8. Kolkema, supra note 1, at 361. 9. Id. The multiplier effect refers to the process by which wages from employment are spent on goods and services, which in turn, provide employment and wages to producers of such goods and services. Id. ( 
citing DELOrTrE & TOUCHE, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF CASINO GAMING ON THE STATE OF MICHIGAN (1995) (on file with the University of Detroit Mercy Law Review)).

Id.
11. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (b)(2) (1994) . The statue provides for the following:
(B) net revenues from any tribal gaming are not to be used for purposes other than -(i) to fund tribal government operations or programs;
(ii) to provide for the general welfare of the Indian tribe and its members; (iii) to promote tribal economic development; (iv) to donate to charitable organizations; or (v) to help fund operations of local government agencies.
12. Naomi Mezey, https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/4 these members between $50,000 and $60,000 a year. 3 Additionally, the Pequot Tribe has guaranteed that it will pay for all of its members' education from preschool through a doctorate. 4 Finally, the Pequots have contributed $10 million to the federal government for the building of an American Indian Museum."
Moreover, the economic effects of Indian gaming are felt far beyond the reservations. For example, it is estimated that one gaming job generates, on average, 1.4 additional jobs in the host economy." Thus, as a result of gaming, Indian tribes have been better able to achieve self-sufficiency and their host economies are greatly benefitted as well.'
II. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act -Its Intended Purpose
Several years before the passage of the IGRA, President Reagan reaffirmed President Nixon's Indian Policy 8 which had initially cited the need for greater tribal self-governance and economic self-sufficiency. President Reagan's Policy noted that "[a] fundamental prerequisite to economic development is capital formation. The establishment of a financial structure that is a part of the Indian reservation community is essential to the development of Indian capital formation. ' "i" Hence, President Reagan concluded that this goal can be achieved only by "removing the federal impediments to tribal self-government."'" 13. Id. at 725. 14. Id.
15.
Id. The Pequot tribe has also employed an archaeologist to "uncover its history and to stock its new museum." Id. 17. The Pequot Tribe, for example, has paid Connecticut over $100 million to protect its current monopoly over slot machines. Mezey, supra note 12, at 725.
18. "Mhe Reagan Administration was altering policy towards Indians in the United States by reducing direct subsidies to Indian tribes and encouraging greater economic self-sufficiency and entrepreneurial activity to replace ... the bankrupted paternalistic policies toward Indian 
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The IGRA promotes these same objectives, and these objectives are "clearly met by Indian gaming."' The Policy stated that the "'economies of American Indian reservations [were] extremely depressed, with unemployment rates among the highest in the country'" before the proliferation of Indian gaming, and past attempts to stimulate their economies failed."' Currently, however, the advantages of Class III gaming are shared by Indians and nonIndians alike allowing Indians to take pride in their culture, independence, and gaming success while still allowing non-Indians to benefit as well. ' It is important to note the IGRA's purpose is "to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments." ' The IGRA, however, does more than protect the tribes. States' rights were also a powerful consideration when Congress enacted the legislation..
In fact, it was over strong opposition by the tribes that the states persuaded Congress to include an escape provision in the IGRA, i.e., the compacting requirement. This controversial provision prohibited an Indian tribe from engaging in casino gaming 'without a state-approved gaming compact. Congress' reasons for including the compacting requirement, were due partly in response to states' fears that tribes would not exercise self-restraint, and partly in response to political pressures.' The IGRA divided Indian gaming into three categories:
Class The IGRA expressly grants a tribe the power to sue a state in federal court to compel good faith negotiations toward the formation of a gaming compact.0 The State asserted its sovereign immunity from suit and moved to dismiss the Tribe's complaint. The district court denied the State's motion. 35 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, however, and found Congress did not have the authority to abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity under the power delegated to Congress through the Indian Commerce Clause.' The Court also found that the doctrine set forth in Ex parte Young does not permit a tribe to sue a state's governor in order to compel good faith negotiations. 
B. The Majority Opinion
In a controversial 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' dismissal of the Tribe's suit. In doing so, the majority held that: (1) Congress lacks authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, 39 and (2) the doctrine of Ex parte Young may not be used to enforce the IGRA against a state official. ' In regard to the issue of immunity, the Court found that the Eleventh Amendment's doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes individual lawsuits brought under federal question as well as diversity jurisdiction. 4 The Court also recognized that Congress may abrogate a state's immunity if it has "unequivocally expressed its intent" to do so, "pursuant to a valid exercise of power." 43 In the present case, Congress' intent to abrogate the states' immunity from suit was "unmistakably clear."" ' On the other hand, the issue of Congress' power to abrogate was explored more fully by the Court.
The Court explored the question of whether the IGRA was passed pursuant to a valid constitutional provision. The IGRA was enacted by Congress under authority granted by the Indian Commerce Clause. In the instant case, the Court reasoned that the Indian Commerce Cause is indistinguishable from the Interstate Commerce Clause. Therefore, the Court's reasoning implicated Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., which recognizes Congress' authority, under the Interstate Commerce Clause, to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity. Rather than attempt to distinguish the instant case from Union Gas, the Court overturned the earlier opinion, declaring it "wrongly decided." ' Union Gas, the Court found, had been proven to be a "solitary departure from established law." ' 47 Ultimately, the Court rejected Union Gas because the divided opinion deviated from the Supreme Court's established federalism jurisprudence and caused confusion in the lower courts.! Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment's express-limitation on diversity actions implied a general limitation on federal question actions.
Moreover, the Court determined that the doctrine of Ex parte Young 4 may not be used to enforce the IGRA against a state official." The Ex parte Young doctrine allows a suit to proceed against a .state official, notwithstanding any claims of state sovereign immunity' The Court found that the intricate remedial scheme created by the IGRA allows a suit to be brought against a state but not against a state's officials. ' 
C. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens' dissent began by tersely examining the fundamental question at issue: "This case is about power -the power of the Congress of the United States to create a private federal cause of action against a State, or its Governor, for the violation of a federal right." ' Stevens further stated: "There can be no serious debate.., over whether Congress has the power to ensure that such a cause of action may be brought by a citizen of the State being sued. Congress' authority in that regard is clear." '5 In his dissent, Justice Stevens examined the origins of the modem doctrine of state sovereign immunity. He derided the majority's assertion that "the Eleventh Amendment's express but partial limitation on [diversity actions found within] Article III reveals that an implicit but more general limitation was already in place." ' Justice Stevens cited the opinion in Hans v. Louisiana in support of the conclusion that the doctrine of state sovereign immunity was a common-law rule that Congress had directed the federal courts to respect, not a constitutional privilege that Congress could not displace by statute? The ruling in Hans, Stevens argued, was based on the fact that Congress had not attempted to overcome the common-law presumption of sovereign immunity."
Justice Stevens insisted that the Court's "fundamental error" was "its failure to acknowledge that its modem embodiment of the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity 'has absolutely nothing to do with the limit on judicial power contained in the Eleventh Amendment."'" m Moreover, Stevens suggested that he would be willing to adhere to a judge-created common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.
6 ' Stevens determined, however, that a common law doctrine could not bar Congress from abrogating state immunity when it clearly expressed its intention to do so.' z In the instant case, Stevens 
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Justice Stevens ended with an unusually direct reproach of the majority opinion. "It may well follow that the misguided opinion of today's majority has nothing more than an advisory character. Whether or not that be so, the better reasoning in Justice Souter's far wiser and far more scholarly opinion will surely be the law one day." ' 
D. Justice Souter's Dissent -Joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer
In his dissent, Justice Souter boldly attacked Hans by employing a lengthy analysis of the historical origins of sovereign immunity. He determined that the Eleventh Amendment only limits federal jurisdiction in cases of citizenstate diversity, not in cases where federal questions are implicated.' Souter's assertion was that since the plaintiffs in the case at bar are citizens of the State that they are suing, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to them.' Therefore, Souter argued that the Court must look elsewhere for the source of the immunity that the State cited. 67 Justice Souter maintained that the source the majority was relying upon was the common-law doctrine of state sovereign immunity, as it was wrongly promoted to the status of constitutional law." Souter, like Stevens, contended that the Court in Hans v. Louisiana had not considered whether Congress could abrogate common-law sovereign immunity by statute. Indeed, he argued that this issue was not specifically addressed until the Supreme Court decided in Union Gas that such immunity had no constitutional status and was subject to abrogation.' The Hans Court wrongly decided, it was argued, that the common law principle of sovereign immunity barred a suit brought against a state by one of its own citizens under federal question jurisdiction. 70 The majority's determination that the simple common law doctrine is now constitutional law "takes its place with other historic examples of textually untethered elevations of judicially derived rules to the status of inviolable constitutional law."
Justice Souter concluded that the Eleventh Amendment bars litigation based on the status of the parties only -and only when they are suing on nonfederal claims. The amendment, he argued, has no applicability to Article 76 Justice Souter maintained that Congress' mentioning of the word "State" in the statutory scheme should "not limit the possible defendants to States and is quite literally consistent with the possibility that a tribe could sue an appropriate state official for a State's failure to negotiate."" Moreover, Justice Souter argued that the fact that a suit against a state official under the Ex parte Young doctrine may have had a significant impact on state government did not invalidate the doctrine's application. 7 Souter explored the history of the doctrine and defended it as more than mere judicial fiction." Justice Souter determined that there was no clear statement of intent to displace the Ex parte Young doctrine in the IGRA. In fact, in no way did Souter find that the IGRA's "intricate remedial mechanisms" displaced the doctrine in the case at bar. Therefore, Justice Souter argued that the Supreme Court should have reversed the Appellate Court's judgment.'
IV. Analysis
A. The Text of the 11th Amendment -Diversity Jurisdiction
The express language of the Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."'" Just from reading the text, the most plausible interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is probably that the Amendment bars diversity actions brought by a citizen of one state against another state." However, other interpretations have been proffered. 
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Nonetheless, it is difficult to dispute that the meaning of the Amendmentderived either textually or historically -is the one aforementioned.' A simple reading of the plain language of the text promptly reveals that the Amendment grants immunity to a state, but only from diversity actions brought by citizens of another state. Moreover, from a practical perspective, the Amendment nearly duplicates Article I's Diversity Jurisdiction Clause." Therefore, its textual meaning is clear. The Amendment bars actions brought against the state by a citizen(s) of another state. Thus, one need look no further -the Framers' intent is readily apparent from the express language of the Eleventh Amendment. ' The very words of the Amendment then should slam the door shut in the face of those wishing to bring suit against the state if they are, in fact, citizens of another state basing their claim on diversity jurisdiction. However, the door should be opened wide for those citizens of the same state wishing to bring their federal question claims arising under congressional authority. Although this seemingly disparate treatment may seem unfair, the Amendment was specifically designed to reach a much fairer compromise and thereby deny only those suits based on diversity jurisdiction. An inquiry into the historical origins of the Eleventh Amendment will provide the policy reasons behind the Amendment's bar on diversity actions and reveal the framers' intent.
The historical debate over the Eleventh Amendment was concerned mainly with private actions to collect war debts owed by the states." There were two sides to this debate: (1) those from debt-ridden states proposing a liberal Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2213, 2239 (1996) . This is an outstanding commentary on the Supreme Court's treatment of both decisions.
83. For example, the Amendment (plus any penumbra) bars (1) both diversity actions and federal question actions by any citizen against any state, including the citizen's own state, unless Congress makes clear that the federal statute at issue is designed to abrogate state sovereign immunity; (2) same as (1), except that citizens are not barred from suing their own state; and (3) same as (1), except that Congress is not allowed to abrogate the immunity. Hovenkamp As with any Amendment, the Eleventh was forged through compromise.
There were strong competing interests -those of the fledgling states who needed a degree of protection to keep from becoming impoverished and those of foreign nationals who needed some degree of recourse to keep our country from suffering foreign relations problems. 3 Upon first glance, it would seem the states' diversity-jurisdiction immunity would prevent all suits by foreign nationals; however, this was not the case. The reason was because Congress had enacted the Treaty of Paris. Thus, suits under the Treaty by foreign nationals would effectively "arise under" Article III's federal question jurisdiction."
Simply put, the Treaty of Paris allowed our foreign creditors -those who helped us gain our Independence by providing the necessary funds to wage our 88. Hovenkamp 
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Revolutionary War -to collect the money we owed to them. Had the Amendment applied to federal question cases as well as diversity cases, it would have rendered those debts uncollectible, and then our nation would have been perceived as financially unsound in the realm of the nation states. Moreover, as Souter noted, "[i]f the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment had meant it to immunize states from federal question suits like those that might be brought to enforce the Treaty of Paris, they would surely have drafted the Amendment differently.""S Ultimately, however, regardless of foreign relations problems and matters of war debts, it seems that giving the states absolute immunity from both federal question actions as well as diversity actions is simply too dangerous. Early on, those who dealt with this issue understood the Amendment's plain textual meaning and the policy reasons behind the limitation. Justice Marshall, for example, recognized a danger in giving the Amendment any broader of a meaning than was already apparent on its face. The danger was that states might shirk their federal obligations, such as those created by the Constitution's Contract Clause, thereby allowing the states to effectively deprive citizens of their federal rights. If the Amendment bars all claims, both those in federal question as well as diversity, then the federal rights that all citizens claim and seek to have protected would be rendered void for lack of federal jurisdiction." What is the value of a federal claim without a federal court to enforce it? The answer is as obvious now as it was then. Therefore, the history of the Eleventh Amendment reveals that the Framers' intent was to limit state sovereign immunity to diversity. But this, of course, does not mean that the majority in Seminole paid the respect due to either the history or to the text of our Eleventh Amendment.
B. Hans -Federal Question Jurisdiction
In Hans v. Louisiana, the, Supreme Court expanded the scope of the Amendment's "sovereignty grant" to include federal questions. 7 The Court, however, did not address the issue of congressional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
Ham It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States.1°T
hus, the Hans Court's analysis was based on a highly controversial interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. An interpretation which seems logically inconsistent.
The best conception for those attempting to reconcile the Court's reasoning in Hans with the text of the Eleventh Amendment was that the federal question sovereign immunity provided by Hans exists only as a matter of federal "constitutional" common law. This 'judge-recognized" common law is enforceable by the courts, but only until Congress expressly provides otherwise."' Therefore, under this rationale, Hans merely supplied us with a federal common law doctrine in effect only until Congress clearly abrogates it, (and Congress has clearly done so with its enactment of the IGRA!).
C. The Majoritys Reasoning Is Flawed!
The overly broad interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment, such as those adopted by Hans and Seminole Tribe, am unjustified both textually and historically. What is remarkable, however, is that even those justices who are widely known as strict "textualists" have welcomed an interpretation of our Constitution that is completely separate from any words that can be found within the text. For example, Justice Scalia, who helped form the majority in Seminole, and who is a respected constitutional law scholar, noted in his dissent in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. that the "plain text of the Amendment makes The decision in Seminole Tribe, however, goes beyond Hans and holds that Congress now lacks the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Hans clearly does not support this newfound contention by the Court. Moreover, since the text of the Eleventh Amendment does not once mention state sovereign immunity from, federal question claims, congressional power to abrogate is not included there either. In fact, until Seminole Tribe, sovereign immunity was still regarded as a common law doctrine, and the simple truth of the matter is that Congress, acting within its delegated powers, has the authority to abrogate the common law.
5 Simply put, "Congress preempts common law rules all the time."' t 6 Most attorneys, law students, and judges (including Supreme Court Justices) are already aware of this. For this reason, Justice Scalia in his Union Gas dissent and Chief Justice Rehnquist in Seminole Tribe were forced to raise sovereign immunity to a constitutional law status. They did so by relying on the position that the Constitution, although expressly silent, mysteriously contains the constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is no longer a simple common law doctrine. Now it's constitutional law." 
V. Ex Parte Young
In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that even though the state itself might be immune, a federal court may assert its jurisdiction against a state officer whose action violates the applicable federal law."' In Seminole, however, the majority attempted to argue that the doctrine of Young should not apply. The majority argued that the IGRA's remedial scheme actually displaced the use of Young.
Justice Souter pointed out, however, that Young does not create one kind of remedy and Congress another. Young, instead stands for a jurisdictional rule, i.e., if one is barred from suing an immune party (the State) then one may proceed against a non-immune party (the officer). Therefore, a case may depend upon Young for its federal jurisdiction and on Congress for its remedy. Thus, Young in no way displaces the procedural rules devised by Congress such as the IGRA.
Moreover, Souter, in his dissent, articulated a very simple truth, i.e., the doctrine of Young came about as a consequence of Hans. Since Hans granted 115. Hovenkamp, supra note 82, at 2245. 116. /d. 117. The irony is that the word "sovereignty" never appears in the Constitution. It does not appear in the Eleventh Amendment, nor in any other Amendment, including the Tenth Amendment where one might expect it to be. The language of the Eleventh Amendment obviously suggests some narrow degree of immunity for the states in diversity cases. Federal question sovereign immunity, however, is no where to be found until the Court in Hamv recognized it as a common law doctrine -one that Congress would obviously be capable of abrogating (that is, until the Seminole decision improperly raised this common law doctrine to the status of constitutional law In fact, since the Court understood the negative implications of its Hans decision, it was therefore forced to create the doctrine espoused in Young. As Souter stated: "[Young was created to provide] a sensible view of immunity expressed in Hans with the principles embodied in the Supremacy Clause and Article IlI."' In other words, the doctrine of Young was created to serve those plaintiffs whose actions were barred as a result of the Court's "judicially discovered" federal question 'immunity. Therefore, it seems logical to assume that if one is barred under a Hans analysis (such as in the instant case) then the doctrine of Young should be used to remedy that loss. After all, Young was created by the Supreme Court to be used in exactly that situation.
The majority's denial of Young, however, should come as no surprise. The majority is merely being consistent with the rest of its opinion in Seminole Tribe.
VI. IGRA and States' Rights
As previously stated, in Seminole Tribe the majority struck down certain provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,' passed by Congress under its power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. That Act permitted Indian tribes to conduct certain types of gaming only if the state permits the same type of gaming "for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity,'"" and the tribe has a compact with the state in which the tribal lands are located. Under the Act, a state was obligated to negotiate in good faith to create such a compact. If the state failed to do so, then the tribe could sue the state in federal court.
On its face, one might view the Gaming Act as an attempt to force states to negotiate with Indian tribes to permit unwanted casino gambling on Indian lands located in the state. But under the Indian Commerce Clause, Congress has plenary power, i.e., the absolute power to apply its own law to the Indian lands and preempt all state law.I" Simply put, Congress could have plainly passed a statute authorizing casino gambling on Indian lands, giving no protection to the states and completely siding in favor of Indian tribes. Had Congress enacted 
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997 legislation of this sort, there would be no controversy. Congress, however, chose an evenhanded approach in enacting the IGRA and therefore considered the states' interests involved. In fact, the states themselves were a principal protagonist and beneficiary of the IGRA, which gave them a measure of control over Indian gaming that the Indian Commerce Clause would clearly deny them." M The provision requiring a "compact" between the state and the tribe was an attempt by Congress to avoid either: (1) complete preemption of state law (which would be the case absent a federal statute recognizing a state right); or (2) a federal statute giving states the authority to regulate gaming on Indian lands.i Thus, the IGRA was a compromise. The act was clearly not an attempt by the federal government to diminish state authority. Instead, the IGRA was a good faith effort to accommodate state interests and concerns.
VII. Union Gas -Lifts the Mystery from This Decision
Aside from the debate over Indian's gaming rights, however, it seems apparent that the Supreme Court had its own reasons for granting certiorari in Seminole. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., a plurality of the Court held that the Interstate Commerce Clause granted Congress authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Because of subsequent appointments to the Court, the Justices who formed the minority in Union Gas perceived an opportunity to reverse that decision. In sum, the newly formed majority has been longing for a case involving Congress' attempted abrogation of state sovereign immunity through the Interstate Commerce Clause in order to implicate Union Gas and reverse it. What they got was legislation passed pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. This was close enough for the Court. Moreover, the majority wanted to restrain Congress from enacting legislation that supposedly interferes with states' sovereign rights. Thus, the Supreme Court seized this newfound opportunity, reversed Union Gas, and held that neither the Indian Commerce Clause nor the Interstate Commerce Clause grant Congress the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity.'" This goes a long way to lifting the mystery of a constitutional law decision which abandons the Constitution in favor of Number 81 of the Federalist and a squinted view beyond the text."
124. See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 2-3, 5 (1988). Another protagonist of the legislation was gaming interests from Nevada, which sought to limit the extent of Indian gaming.
125. See Roland J. Assuming that this is a justifiable explanation for the Courts decision, the practical problem with the Court's reasoning is twofold. First, if the majority is attempting to make a ruling in favor of state's rights, it need only uphold the IGRA. As previously noted, Congress enacted the compacting requirement to benefit the states, not the Indians. In fact, the provision was included over the objection of the Indians. Congress chose a reasonable requirement, taking into account the states' and the Indians' rights. It seems illogical for the majority to strike down this provision under the guise of benefitting the states.
Second, even if the majority's desire was to benefit the states, there is really no reason why the doctrine of Ex parte Young also should be held inapplicable. This doctrine should have been used to provide a reasonable compromise, i.e., the Court could overturn Union Gas but leave room for the Indians' claim under Ex parte Young. The majority's insistence on closing both doors is not just mysterious, it seems downright ludicrous.
VIII. Conclusion
The majority in Seminole Tribe is blind -both to the obvious meaning of the text of our Constitution and to the Framers who established it. The Seminole Tribe decision improperly raises a simple and undeniable common law doctrine -federal question sovereign immunity -to the unjustifiable status of constitutional law. Indeed, the Supreme Court's use of stare decisis through Hans utterly fails, going far beyond any fair reading required by precedent. The Supreme Court's interpretation in Seminole should provoke outrage among those who are sincerely committed to upholding the integrity of the United States Constitution. Simply put, it is the Court's responsibility to uphold the Constitution, not ignore it, and the Court's analysis in Seminole Tribe ignores both the text and the history of the Eleventh Amendment.
Moreover, the IGRA was intended to provide a means of tribal selfsufficiency while protecting states' rights. So, now a Court, which appears to favor states' rights, has put Congress in the position of rewriting the legislation to accommodate only Indian concerns. Furthermore, the doctrine of Ex parte Young could have formed a reasonable compromise, but the Court's unwillingness to apply this doctrine merely reveals its callous approach to such issues.
Overall, the Court's reasons for granting certiorari and deciding Seminole in such an entirely unjustified manner defy common sense, yet the Supreme Court did so. Whether the Indians are victims of some real battle being waged by the majority against the decision in Union Gas, or whether the Court truly believes in its own unprecedented legal analysis, the case remains a testament to the casualties the Court inflicts when it engages in outcome determinative decision making. The great buffalo which roamed the plains centuries ago are almost entirely extinct. If Congress does not correct what the Court has done, the extinction of the "New Buffalo" might soon follow.
